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Comments and Casenotes
Attachment Of Wages In Maryland
By RoBERT LEE KARWACKI*
Wages earned by an employee constitute a debt owed
him by his employer and may be considered as much a part
of his assets as any other property which he may own.
However, as to his judgment creditor's right to garnish this
asset in satisfaction of his claim against such employee,
every state in the United States, except South Dakota, has
interposed an exemption to some extent in favor of the
employee. This legislation basically is an attempt at a
compromise between the entrenched principle of the com-
mon law that a judgment debtor should not be allowed to
own property while his judgment creditor goes unpaid, and
the realization that if a judgment debtor is deprived of
every means of acquiring the necessities of life, he and his
family will become wards of the state. Maryland's attempt
at this compromise appears as Article 9, Section 33, of the
Annotated Code:
"No attachment of the wages or hire of any laborer
or employee, in the hands of the employer, whether
private individuals or bodies corporate, shall affect any
salary or wages of the debtor which are not actually
due at the date of the attachment; and the sum of one
hundred dollars of such wages or hire due to any
laborer or employee by any employer or corporation
shall always be exempt from attachment by any pro-
cess whatever. Every contract or agreement of any
character whatsoever of such laborer or employee, the
purpose of which is to waive this right of exemption,
shall be absolutely void, provided, however, that the
salary or wages of any laborer or employee shall not be
exempt from attachment, levy or lieu (sic) at the
instance of the State for income tax due the State by
any such laborer or employee."1
* Class of 1956, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1954, Uni-
versity of Maryland; Casenote Editor, Vol. XVI.
IMd. Code (1951). This has been the form of the statute since 1943
(Ch. 635). The word "lien" was evidently Intended. The first wage exemp-
tion statute was enacted In 1852 (Ch. 340), providing that:
"... the wages or hire of any laborer or other employee In -the hands
of the employer, when such wages or hire shall not exceed the sum of
ten dollars, and when the amount of such wages or hire shall exceed the
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This comment's purpose is to review the construction
given the various phases of this statute by the Maryland
courts. Cases used for the support of propositions which
were decided prior to the present enactment of the statute
will be referred to where they were decided under a phrase
of the then current statute which appears substantially in
said sum, then ten dollars of the amount of such wages or hire shall be
exempted from attachment, whether on warrant or on judgment."
This statute was amended in 1854 (Ch. 23), when it was further enacted
that:
... . no attachment of the wages or hire of a laborer or other em-
ployee, in the hands of the employers, whether private individuals or
bodies corporate, shall affect any salary or wages of the debtor, which
are not actually due at the date of the attachment."
In 1874, the whole statute was repealed and a new one enacted (Ch. 45).
It read:
"No attachments upon warrant, judgment upon two non-ests, or upon
original process, shall issue against, be levied on or affect the wages
or hire of any laborer, or employee, not actually due at the date of such
attachment in the hands of the employers, whether such employers be
individuals or corporations, unless the debt or judgment upon which
such attachment is issued shall, exclusive of costs, exceed the sum of
$100; and the sum of $100 of such wages, or hire due to any laborer
or employee, by any employer, or corporation shall always be exempt
from attachment by any process whatever; provided, that this act and
nothing herein contained shall apply or in any manner effect any
existing debt, contract, note, or judgment, nor prevent any person or
body corporate from issuing an attachment on any judgment, now
obtained or which may hereafter be obtained on any note, debt or con-
tract existing at the time of the passage of this act; and provided that
nothing in this act shall apply to non-resident defendants."
In 1886 (Ch. 65), the statute was again repealed and re-enacted to pro-
vide:
"No attachments of the wages or hire of any laborer or employee in
the hands of the employer, whether private individuals or bodies cor-
porate, shall affect any salary or wages of the debtor which are not
actually due at the date of the attachment; and the sum of one hundred
dollars of such wages or hire due to any laborer or employee by any
employer or corporation shall always be exempt from attachment by
any process whatever."
In 1929 (Ch. 265), the Legislature excepted from the provisions of the
wage attachment statute, judgments entered for "foodstuffs, meats, pro-
visions, and other food supplies". This statute was declared unconstitutional
by the Maryland Court in Kelman v. Ryan, 163 Md. 519, 163 A. 593 (1933),
as a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U. S. Constitution.
In 1933, the statute was again repealed and re-enacted (Ch. 104, Special
Session) ; however the only purpose was to add the following sentence to
the Act of 1886, Ch. 65:
"Every contract or agreement of any character whatsoever of such
laborer or employee, the purpose of which is to waive this right of
exemption, shall be absolutely void."
The purpose of the re-enactment of the statute, as expressed by the Pre-
amble to the Act, was :to overrule the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the case of Lawrence v. Commercial Booking Corp., 165 Md. 559, 169 A. 69
(1933), where It was held that a debtor could validly waive the benefits
of the statute when signing a promissory note.
In 1943, the privileges of the statute were taken away from debtors of
the State for income taxes and it was re-enacted in its present form.
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the same form in the present statute. Other problems which
become apparent, but which have not been answered by
the Court of Appeals, will be viewed in light of the apparent
intent expressed by the Maryland Legislature and of de-
cisions in other jurisdictions that were faced with similar
problems.
Who Is Entitled To The Exemption?
The statute grants the $100 exemption to "any laborer
or employee". This broad designation has received an
equally broad interpretation by the Maryland Court of
Appeals. In Moore v. Heaney, which was decided just eight
years after the exemption's origin, the judgment debtor had
contracted to build the garnishee a home and was to receive
a compensation based on 5% of the cost of the building. The
Court held that the judgment debtor was an "employee"
within the meaning of the Act. This early interpretation
of "employee" set the tenor for the meaning of the designa-
tion in the cases which were to follow. In Wilmer v. Mann3
a judgment debtor employed as a piano salesman for a
weekly salary of $30.00 per week was considered an em-
ployee under the wage exemption statute. Furthermore, a
judgment debtor who was employed as a sales manager and
salesman and received a salary of $250 and $50.00 for ex-
penses per month was said to be an employee notwithstand-
ing the fact that he was also a stockholder, director and
vice-president of the garnishee.4 The Court of Appeals
reasoned:
"... the Legislature must have used the word
'employee' to cover such persons in that class as would
not be described by the term 'laborer' and that con-
struction appears to be reasonable and logical, since
the reason for the exemption is the same in both cases,
to wit, the fact that the employee whether laborer or
not depends largely upon his wages for support, for
there is no apparent reason to distinguish between the
necessities of one engaged in manual or physical toil
and one engaged in a clerical capacity, and to give to
one an immunity denied to the other, when both alike
are wage earners depending upon their wages for
support. '5
2 14 Md. 558 (1860).
' 121 Md. 239, 88 A. 222 (1913).
' Shriver v. Carlin & Fulton Co., 155 Md. 51, 141- A. 434, 58 A. L. R.
767 (1928).5 Ibid, 56, 58.
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In reference to the fact that the judgment debtor was also
a stockholder, director and vice-president of his employer-
garnishee, the Court concluded:
"... there seems to be no valid reason why his
occupancy of such office should disqualify him from
serving the corporation in some other and different
capacity, or from becoming its employee, where the
duties and incidents of his employment are separate
and distinct from those pertaining to his office."
Because of the above decisions and the broad definition
therein of those who may claim an exemption, it is hard
to venture an opinion as to where the Maryland Court will
see fit to draw the line in excluding persons with an earned
income from the benefits of the statute. The Court to date
has shown no inclination to limit the class of the statute's
beneficiaries for as was pointed out in the Wilmer case:
"The statute creating an exemption in favor of a
class of persons least able to protect themselves and
largely dependent on their wages for support of them-
selves and others dependent upon them, should be given
a liberal and not a technical construction. 6
In accordance with the general postulate that exemption
laws should be construed liberally in favor of the debtor,
most courts in this country have given the word, "em-
ployee", in their wage exemption statutes, the broad inter-
pretation evidenced in the Maryland decisions. Thus, an
auditor,' chorister,' president and general manager' sales-
man paid on commission,10 attorney," theatre manager, 2
independent contractor,"3 a corporation executive perform-
0 Supra, n. 3, 248. Cf. Casualty Ins. Company case, 82 Md. 535, 34 A.
778 (1896), where the Court of Appeals gave a stricter Interpretation of
the word, "employee", in construing the preference section of the Insolvency
laws. The Court pointed out the different legislative intent In enacting the
two statutes.
' Bovard v. Ford, 83 Mo. App. 498 (1900).8 Catlin v. Ensign, 29 Pa. S. 264 (1857).9 Koppen v. Union Iron & Foundry Co., 181 Mo. App. 72, 163 S. W. 500
(1914) ; Danziger v. Ferber, 272 Pa. 193, 116 A. 516 (1922) ; contra, South
and N. A. R. Co. v. Falkner, 49 Ala. 115 (1873).
"'Hamberger v. Corr, 157 Pa. 133, 27 A. 681 (1893) ; Barnes v. William
Waltke & Co., 135 Mo. App. 488, 116 S. W. 7 (1909).
u Bell v. Roberts, 150 Pa. 469, 28 A. 2d 715 (1942).
"Integrity Trust Co. v. Taylor, 312 Pa. S. 3, 167 A. 363 (1933).
H. F. Watson Co. v. Christ, 62 Pa. Super. 604 (1916) ; Huck-Gerhardt
Co. v. Davies, 134 Pa. S. 430, 3 A. 2d 963 (1939) ; contra, Shahan v. Biggs
& Co., 123 S. W. 2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App., 1938) ; Brasker v. Carnation Co. of
Texas, 92 S. W. 2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936).
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ing purely managerial duties14 and a member of a state
legislature 5 have been held to be employees and conse-
quently entitled to the benefits of the wage exemption
statutes.
In the case of state and municipal employees, wages are
not attachable in Maryland. In Baltimore v. Root, 6 it was
held that the salary of a police officer was not subject to
garnishment. The court in this early case concluded that
to allow such attachments would seriously hinder and delay
the business of the public officers who must depend on a
steady supply of funds to carry out their business.' 7 The
qualification to this principle is that the garnishee must
prove that the funds attached are public funds and are not
being held by him in some other capacity.'"
What Is Considered Wages, Hire Or Salary Within The
Meaning Of The Exemption Statute?
Webster's definition of "wages", "hire" and "salary"
when read together, encompass virtually every possible
form of monetary compensation for energy expended for
another. 9 The Court of Appeals' construction of their
definition in the exemption statute is not quite as broad.
However, the Maryland Court has considered, as within
the meaning of wages, hire and salary a commission paid
to a builder of house, 0 the severance pay of employee,"'
and the traveling expenses of a salesmanager and sales-
man." While deciding that traveling expenses were salary
within the meaning of the statute, the Court said:
"White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532 (Fla., 1952).
SGeorges v. Wegrocki, 122 N. J. L. 109, 4 A. 2d 274 (1939).
168 Md. 95 (1855).
17 bid, 100.
IWilson v. Ridgely, 46 Md. 235 (1877); Robertson v. Beall, 10 Md.
125 (1856).
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1942) 2203, salary-
"The recompense or consideration paid ... to a person at regular in-
tervals for services, esp. to holders of official, executive, or clerical
positions; fixed compensation regularly paid, as by the year, quarter
month, or week;
2863, wages-
"Pay given for labor, usually manual or mechanical, at short stated
intervals, as distinguished from salaries or fees."
1182, hire-
"The price, reward, or compensation paid, or contracted to be paid,
for the temporary use of a thing or a place, for personal service, or for
labor; pay; reward; . . ."
Moore v. Heaney, 14 Md. 558 (1860).
2 Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 207 Md. 225, 114 A. 2d 45 (1955).




"The three words 'wages', 'salary' and 'hire', al-
though varying perhaps in their scope, nevertheless
express one idea common to them all - compensation
for personal services of some kind.... It (the traveling
expenses) certainly was not a gift, nor was it made to
satisfy any obligation due Fulton by the corporation
other than for services rendered by him to it. The
nature of his services was such as to require certain
expenditures for transportation and subsistence, with-
out which the services could not have been rendered."28
In First National Bank v. Jaggers,24 the judgment debtor
was an agent of the Aetna Life Insurance Company and
made deposits and withdrawals from its account at the de-
fendant bank under a power of attorney. The plaintiff,
believing that the bank account was in the name of the
judgment debtor laid an attachment in the bank's hands.
The cashier of the bank withheld $2,000 from a demand of
the Insurance Company to withdraw all its funds. It later
appeared that the $2,000 was an amount owed the judgment
debtor. The Court held that the $2,000 debt could not be
considered as wages, hire or salary under the exemption
statute. Assuming that the $2,000 was a debt owed the
judgment debtor which was not owing him as compensa-
tion for his services, this case presents a distinction drawn
by the Court between a debt owed the judgment debtor on
a transaction out of the scope of his employment and one
arising as compensation for his services.
The above cases seem to indicate that the Maryland
Court would probably consider any compensation for work
or services performed under a contract of employment as
wages, hire and salary as used in the statute. This statement
of the rule would necessarily exclude any money received
on an investment or as a gift.
The Court of Appeals has not been faced with the
further problem, which has arisen in other jurisdictions, of
how long the wages or salary once paid retain the exempt
character. It has been held that the deposit of earnings in
a bank did not change their exempt character, and there-
fore they were not subject to attachment.25 On the other
hand, war bonds purchased with money the debtor had
authorized his employer to deduct from his wages,26
Ibid, 59. Parenthetical material added.T 31 Md. 38 (1869).
Staton v. Vernon, 209 Ia. 1123, 229 N. W. 763, 67 A. L. R. 1200 (1930);
Rutter v. Shumway, 16 Colo. 95, 26 P. 321 (1891).




U. S. Bonds purchased with attachment-exempt veterans'
benefits,27 and land purchased with exempt veterans'
benefits2" were held to be attachable by the employee's
creditors since the funds had lost their exempt character.
Where the garnishee acting as an attorney for the debtor,
collected wages due the debtor from his employer and these
wages were attached while in the attorney's hands, the
Delaware Court concluded that the money lost its nature as
wages when paid to the attorney, and the debtor was not
entitled to the exemption which was accorded to wages in
the state.29 The cases holding that the wages lose their
exempt character when deposited in bank or when con-
verted into other forms of property seem to be the better
reasoned ones. The opposite result would present the prob-
lem of what degree of conversion of the wages may be made
without impairing the fund's protection from creditors.
What Wages, Hire Or Salary Earned Are Attachable?
"No attachment of the wages or hire of any laborer or
employee.., shall affect any salary or wages of the debtor
which are not actually due at the date of the attachment"
according to the statute. It is apparent under the statute,
therefore, that a wage-earner who is paid once or twice a
month has less of an exemption than one paid more fre-
quently. For example, an employee who earns $100 per
week and is paid every week has his complete salary pro-
tected from his creditors by the exemption statute which
exempts $100 of the amount due. But if the same employee
were paid twice a month, his creditor would be in a position
to attach approximately half of his salary since the accumu-
lation of income would then amount to over $200 from
which only $100 would be exempt. However, the Legisla-
ture has made no attempt in the one hundred year history
of the exemption to resolve this inconsistency.
This part of the statute was construed in the recent case
of Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy,80 where the plaintiff laid an
attachment in the hands of the garnishee on June 1, 1954,
and on June 6, 1954, the judgment debtor was paid $4,305.67
as severance pay. The Court of Appeals decided that the
severance pay was not attachable since it was not "due
when the attachment was laid". However, the decision is
confusing in that the Court also decided the money was
Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U. S. 545 (1939).
In re Gardner, 220 Wis. 493, 264 N. W. 643 (1936).
1 Tressler v. Lunt, 158 A. 709 (Del. 1932).
$0 Supra, n. 21.
19561
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payable as wages because the judgment debtor received it
for services rendered, but that there was not such an agree-
ment between the garnishee and judgment debtor for the
payment of the severance pay which the judgment debtor
could enforce; in effect, that the severance pay was wages
gratuitously paid. The Court's conclusion gives a new
breadth to the definition of "wages".
The result in the Hoy case can be analogized to several
decisions of lower courts in Maryland appearing previous
to it. In The Second National Bank v. Sharer3' the judg-
ment debtor was employed by the garnishee whose policy
was to pay its employees twice a month, on the 13th and
28th of each month. Because of a lag caused by the neces-
sary bookkeeping, on the 13th of the month the employees
would be paid the wages earned during the last part of the
previous month, and on the 28th the money earned during
the first part of the current month. The attachment was laid
on May 9, 1949. The previous pay period had ended April
31, 1949, during which time the judgment debtor had earned$192.32. Between May 1st and May 8th the judgment debtor
had earned $54.02, however this was not to become payable
until May 28th. The Circuit Court for Allegany County,
Henderson, J., held that only the $192.32 was subject to
attachment and of this amount $100 was exempt. This
Court reasoned that only the wages "due and payable" to
the judgment debtor under the terms of his employment
were attachable. This implied limitation thereby read into
the statute, i.e., that the wages in addition to being due
must also be payable under the terms of the judgment
debtor's employment, was followed by Chief Judge Rhyn-
hart of the Peoples' Court of Baltimore City in a subsequent
case. 2 In this case the judgment debtor was employed by
the garnishee whose custom of employment was to with-
hold two weeks wages of his employee at all times so that
on each pay day the employee would receive wages he had
earned during the pay period which had ended two weeks
before. The judgment debtor began his employment on
June 6th and worked until June 23rd when the plaintiff
laid his attachment. At this time the wages earned during
the week of June 6-12, which amounted to $70.20, were pay-
able. However, the judgment debtor had earned $191.09
during his whole term of employment which was unpaid
"(Unreported) #19 Originals, July Term 1949, Circuit Court for Allegany
Co. May 18, 1949. In Seaboard Finance Company v. James, Balto. City Court,
Cullen, J., Aug. 10, 1955, the Court adopted the due and payable construc-
tion in a case with a factual situation similar to the above.
Regal Shop v. Bethlehem Steel Co., Daily Record, Aug. 10, 1955.
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at the time the attachment was laid. The Court held that
only the $70.20 which was payable at the time of the
attachment was subject to garnishment, and consequently,
since the judgment debtor was entitled to a $100 exemp-
tion, nothing was attachable.
The Maryland Court has repeatedly stated that the
attaching creditor merely steps into the shoes of the debtor
and can only recover to the same extent as the debtor
could." Thus, in view of the wage exemption's purpose,
i.e., the protection of the judgment debtor and his depend-
ents, it would seem that the legislative intent would not be
served by forcing the judgment debtor to violate his em-
ployment contract in order to collect all wages which he had
earned in order to allow his judgment creditor to attach
that sum, rather then the sum then payable to him.
The Hoy case may be useful as a precedent in another
respect. It has become a common practice in recent years
for employers to give bonuses at the end of the year for
services rendered by their employees. Under the Hoy case
these bonuses would seem to qualify as wages, hire or
salary, and therefore could only be garnished when pay-
able, i.e., as a practical matter on the day they were handed
out. It should be noted that this requirement of attaching
on the day the bonus is paid would not seem to be neces-
sary in all cases where wages are being attached. Although
the requirement laid down by the lower Court cases supra,
that wages must be "due and payable" before they are
attachable would lead one to this conclusion, the attach-
ment in the Allegany County case, where the requirement
appears to have originated, was not laid on a pay day.
Rather, it was laid between the end of the period in which
the wages were earned and the day on which the wages for
that period were payable. As was pointed out in the above
discussion of that case, the Court held attachable the wages
due for the period which had ended. Thus, the better dis-
tinction to be drawn from this case would be that only
wages earned during a pay period which has ended are
attachable. This view would allow an attachment at any
time between the end of such pay period and the handing
of the wages to the employee. If this view is adopted, only
when the pay day coincides with the end of the pay period
will it be necessary to lay the attachment on that day in
order to attach the wages earned during that pay period.
mMyer v. L. L. & Globe Ins. Co., 40 Md. 595 (1874) ; Manton v. Hoyt, 43
Md. 254 (1875) ; Wilmer v. Epstein, 116 Md. 140, 81 A. 379 (1911) ; Cole




From What Amount Is The $100 Wage Exemption
Deducted?
With the advent of social security and income tax deduc-
tions from wages, the question of whether these deductions
should be made before the $100 exemption is allowed the
employee - judgment debtor becomes important. The
wage-exemption statute provides no answer to the problem.
The Federal84 and State" income tax withholding pro-
visions, as well as the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, 6
require most employers to withhold a stipulated amount
from the wages of their employees at the source of the em-
ployment. The wage-earner has no right to demand that no
deductions be made. Thus as a practical matter the money
withheld should not be considered part of the wages with
which the judgment debtor is to provide the necessaries
of life for himself and his dependents. For this reason it
would seem the better view would be to allow the judg-
ment debtor-employee to deduct $100 of his take-home pay,
leaving for his creditors the excess of $100 less the required
deductions. This conclusion would appear to find some sup-
port in the decisions of the Court of Appeals recognizing
that the plaintiff in wage attachment merely steps into the
shoes of the judgment debtor-employee and can only re-
cover to the extent that the latter could recover from his
employer.8 ' For, as the Court said in a recent case:
"The test of the garnishee's liability is that he has
funds, property or credits in his hands, the property of
the debtor, for which the debtor would have the right
to sue. The plaintiff can recover from the garnishee
only by the same rights and to the same extent as the
debtor could recover if he were suing the garnishee."'
A clear deduction from the above statement of the rule
announced by the Court would be that since the judgment
debtor has no right to sue his employer for money withheld
from his wages as income tax and social security contribu-
tions, his attaching creditor would also have no right to do
so. Therefore, since the withheld fund is not subject to suit
and since the employee receives no direct benefit from the
-26 U. S. C. A. (I. R. C., 1954), 3402(a) (1955 Supp.).
w Md. Code Supp. (1955), Art. 81, Sec. 308 (a).
26 U. S. C. A. (1955 ed.) (I. R. C., 1954), 3102 (a).
wSupra, n. 33.




money so withheld, it could be logically argued that the
$100 exemption should be applied to the balance due the
employee after the deductions rather than to the gross
amount of wages earned by the employee.
Although the Maryland Court has not been called upon
to rule on this problem, some cases from other American
jurisdictions would seem to support the line of reasoning
above set out. Where a statute exempted wages "used to
provide the necessaries of life for the wage earner's family",
and the garnishee in an attachment of the judgment debtor's
wages confessed assets of $148.66, and the jury found that
$143.06 of that amount was used to provide "necessaries",
the California Court held that $8.00 deducted for social
security, unemployment insurance, etc., should be con-
sidered as a necessary expense, and therefore none of the
wages was attachable."' In a Georgia case,40 the debtor had
contracted to paint the garnishee's store, and the garnishee
under the terms of the contract was to pay for all labor and
materials. In the course of the work the garnishee paid a
certain sum to laborers whom the debtor had hired. Later
an attachment was laid and the Court held that the sum
previously paid to the laborers should not be considered
a part of the debtor's compensation for the work and was
not subject to attachment under the wage exemption statute
in force which exempted from garnishment $1.25 per day
and half of the excess above that of the daily, weekly, or
monthly wages of all persons, whether in the hands of their
employers or not. In a recent case the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that although the
amount withheld under the Internal Revenue Code from
salaries and wages of employees for Federal Insurance Con-
tribution taxes and income and withholding taxes is meas-
ured by the amount of wages earned, money due the United
States by an employer for the amount so withheld was ow-
ing as taxes, not as wages, and therefore was not within the
coverage of a bond for wages required of contractor engaged
in the construction of public buildings by a Texas statute.41
In all of the above cases the amounts deducted from the
wages so as to divert them from the hands of the em-
0 Sanker v. Humborg, 48 Cal. App. 2d 205, 119 P. 2d 433 (1941).
,oJ. Austin Dillon Co. v. Edwards Shoe Stores, 53 Ga. App. 437, 186 S. E.
470 (1936).
"General Casualty Co. of America v. U. S., 205 F. 2d 753 (5th Cir., 1953).
See also U. S. F. & G. Co. v. U. S., 201 F. 2d 118 (10th Cir., 1952) ; U. S.
v. Zschach Const. Co., 110 F. Supp. 551 (E. D. Okla., 1953) ; Rivard v. Bijou
Furniture Co., 67 R. I. 251, 21 A. 2d 563 (1941) ; afl'd. on rehearing, 68
R. I. 358, 27 A. 2d 853 (1942).
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ployee were no longer treated as wages in the respective
situations.42
If the problem is viewed from the standpoint of the
apparent intent of the Maryland Legislature another worthy
argument is possible. The amount of wages protected from
the employee's creditors has been set at $100 since 1874
when no deductions for taxes, etc., were demanded by the
State and Federal governments. This sum was in 1874 and
is apparently presently considered an amount necessary for
a wage-earner to provide "bread and board" for himself
and his family. If the wage-earner's salary is subject to a
deduction for the attachment first and then subject to a
further deduction for his taxes, etc., due the government,
it would seem that the legislative intent would be defeated
in that his "take-home" pay would not meet the legislative
standard required for providing the necessaries of life for
himself and his family.
In contrast to the deductions which must be made by the
employer at the insistence of the State and Federal govern-
ments, those types of deductions which are made by the
employer at the request of the employee possibly should
be considered in a different light. Deductions made for
premiums in a group insurance plan, as contributions to
various charities, and as deposits in a company "thrift"
plan would be of this type. In the later type of deductions,
the employee receives a more direct benefit from the money
than in the case of the money withheld for taxes, etc. For
this reason, the legislative intent commented on above
would not seem to be violated if the deductions of this type
would be made from the $100 exempted from attachment
by the statute.
Possible Exceptions.
As pointed out in the preceding sections, the Maryland
Court and most other Courts have construed their respec-
tive States' wage exemption statutes liberally in favor of
the debtor since the purpose of the statutes was to protect
"a class of persons who are largely dependent on their
wages for support".43 However, it should be observed that
11 But see Harris v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 42 Ga. App.,260, 155 S. E.
497 (1930), where the debtor had earned $58.80 in 28 days prior to the time
the attachment was laid, and $35.40 of that amount was paid to a creditor
of the debtor by the garnishee under an agreement with the debtor. Under
the exemption statute the debtor was entitled to a $35.00 exemption. The
Court held that wages earned, not the balance due after payment to the
employee's creditor, determined the wages exempt from garnishment.
22 Am. Jur. 56, Exemptions, Sec. 64, ef 8eq.
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some courts in this country have made exceptions to the
exemptions of these statutes in cases where the attaching
creditor is the wife or other dependent of the debtor whose
attachment is on a claim for alimony or support.4 In a
recent New Jersey case, 5 where the defaulting alimony
payor was receiving a pension which by statute was
"exempt from execution, garnishment, attachment, or other
legal process" and the pension was attached by his divorced
wife for the alimony in arrears, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the fund could be reached to satisfy the
alimony arrearage. The reason given by most Courts in
disregarding the statutory exemptions in cases involving
alimony or support of dependents was probably best stated
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia:
".... the usual purpose of exemption is to relieve
the person exempted from the pressure of claims hostile
to his dependents' essential needs as well as his own
personal ones, not to relieve him of familial obligations
and destroy what may be the family's last and only
security, short of public relief.
4 6
Thus, this reasoning of the courts gives the legislative intent
present in all exemption statutes precedence over the literal
interpretation of the statute.
Another interesting decision has recently been handed
down by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. 8 It was there held that a state
wage exemption statute could not bar the collection of a
judgment in favor of the United States. The court reasoned
that since at common law creditors could attach wages of
their debtor, and since there was no federal statute barring
such garnishment, the only possible bar to the collection of
the judgment was the action of the Pennsylvania legislature,
and therefore "the United States, as a sovereign seeking to
"Jackson v. Jackson, 194 Misc. 134, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 516 (1948) ; Huling
v. Huling, 194 Ga. 819, 22 S. E. 2d 832 (1942) ; Davis v. Davis, 67 N. W.
2d 566 (Iowa, 1954) ; Felder v. Felder's Estate, 195 Miss. 326, 13 So. 2d
823 (1943).
0 Fischer v. Fischer, 13 N. J. 16Z 98 A. 2d 568 (1953).
, Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 71 App. D. C. 350, 112 F. 2d 177, 185, 130 A. L. R.
1014 (1940).1  It is well to note that Maryland has allowed a spendthrift trust to be
invaded for debt arising from alimony, Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Robertson,
192 Md. 653, 65 A. 2d 292 (1949), noted 10 Md. L. Rev. 359 (1949) ; Hitchins
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 193 Md. 53, 66 A. 2d 93 (1949), noted 11 Md.
L. Rev. 71 (1950) ; and on separation agreement, see Zouck v. Zouck, 204
Md. 285, 104 A. 2d 573 (1954).
'"U. S. v. Miller, 134 F. Supp. 276 (E. D. Pa., 1955).
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collect its debts, cannot be bound by either legislative or
judicial acts of a member state". 9 The constitutional ques-
tions raised by this decision are beyond the scope of this
comment. It is well to note, however, that the Maryland
wage-exemption statute expressly does not apply to collec-
tion by the State of its income tax.
In conclusion, it may justifiably be said that the Mary-
land Court has been ready at all times to reach an equitable
result and has been aided in that purpose somewhat by the
broad language of the wage exemption statute which it was
considering. Furthermore, the Court has struck down any
subterfuge set up to defeat the statute's protection of the
wage-earner.50 Much can be said, therefore, for a broad
statute in an area, such as here, where the solution to the
situations which arise is best reached many times by broad
discretionary powers in the Court.
Federal Policy Regarding Evidence
Illegally Seized
Rea v. United States'
Federal narcotics officers, under a void search warrant,
arrested petitioner, George Rea, and seized marihuana in
his possession. Rea was then indicted in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico for violation
of the Marihuana Tax Act, and while awaiting trial, moved
that the evidence so obtained be suppressed. The motion
was granted and the district attorney then moved for
dismissal.
Thereafter, upon complaint signed by a federal nar-
cotics officer, petitioner was indicted in a New Mexico state
court for having been in possession of marihuana contrary
to a local criminal statute. Before trial in the state proceed-
ing, petitioner again went to the federal court, filing a
motion for a contempt show cause order to enjoin the nar-
cotics officers: (1) from testifying in the state trial, and
(2) from handing over the illegally seized evidence to state
,0 Ibid, 278.
10 See Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203 (1877), where the Court enjoined a
judgment creditor from attaching a debtor's salary out of state with intent
to avoid the Maryland wage exemption statute.
The Legislature has been equally harsh In deterring the assignment of
claims out of state with the purpose of avoiding the wage exemption
granted in the statute. Md. Code (1951) Art. 83, Secs. 15, 16, 17 and 18,
provides civil remedies for the debtor and criminal penalties for the assignor.
I ... U. S ... , 76 S. Ct. 292 (1956).
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